



2024 European Parliament Post-Elections Report

Digital Services Act - Elections Guidelines

Updated November 21, 2024

The report published September 13, 2024 was updated on November 21, 2024 in the following ways:

- 1. The definition for Proactive Rate in Section 1 was updated for increased precision.*
 - 2. The description for the “Content Treated with Misinformation Labels Around the EP Elections” table in Section 6 was corrected to confirm this is for content viewed by users in the EU (not content created by EU users).*
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September 13, 2024

This report is published by Meta Platforms Ireland Limited (“Meta”) in relation to the Facebook Very Large Online Platform (“Facebook”) and Instagram Very Large Online Platform (“Instagram”), in accordance with the Communication from the Commission (C/2024/3014) on Commission Guidelines for providers of Very Large Online Platforms and Very Large Online Search Engines on the mitigation of systemic risks for electoral processes pursuant to Article 35(3) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 (the “Digital Services Act”), (the “Election Guidelines”). The following outlines Meta’s post-election review of the European Parliament (“EP”) elections held June 6 - 9, 2024.

Introduction

Over many years, Meta has developed a comprehensive approach for elections on its platforms. These policies and procedures were in place for the EP elections, which were held June 6 - 9, 2024 and which drew to a close more than a year of preparations by teams across Meta to identify and mitigate the most pressing platform risks posed by the elections. The EP elections also took place in a congested election year, with more than 64 nations holding elections globally, and were the first EU-wide elections to take place

under the Digital Services Act and its associated Election Guidelines published in the spring.

Since 2016, Meta has invested more than \$20 billion into safety and security and quadrupled the size of our global team working in this area to around 40,000 people. This includes 15,000 content reviewers who review content across Facebook and Instagram in more than 80 languages. And while each election is unique, we have used our experience working on more than 200 elections around the world to build a robust election program that includes mature processes, tools, and policies to protect speech on our platform and safeguard the integrity of the elections. We continuously improve these measures to make sure they remain responsive to risks as they emerge, and we have reinforced these efforts in light of the regulatory framework set out under the Digital Services Act, the Election Guidelines, and our commitments in the EU Code of Practice on Disinformation.

For the EP elections, Meta utilised these election management processes, refined over many years by teams with expertise in electoral risk mitigation, as well as local knowledge and context. We worked hard to adopt feedback from the European Commission, Digital Services Coordinators (“DSCs”), election authorities, and civil society, making additional adjustments and improvements to our processes in light of the Elections Guidelines and the discussions undertaken at the European Commission’s roundtables and cross-sector tabletop exercise.

Whilst we experienced no major incidents during this electoral period, it was not without its complexity and learnings. We have enhanced certain tools and levers at our disposal to tackle threats from adversarial actors; expanded communication channels with key election authorities, DSCs, and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs); and launched new tools in light of the emerging Generative AI space.

Safeguarding elections integrity is a top priority for Meta, but we couldn’t have done it alone. While Meta has long worked with external partners, the regulatory framework under the DSA and the Election Guidelines strengthened the importance of establishing formal cooperation channels. More than ever, we worked closely with EU-level and member state authorities, platforms, fact-checkers, and CSOs to put in place cooperation mechanisms for any potential threats that could manifest ahead of the elections. We learned the importance of better understanding the roles, capabilities, and challenges of each of the parties and are working to continue to provide the same level of support and transparency in the elections to come.

This report aims to provide further detail on our established elections risk management systems, the improvements we have made, and the mitigations we deployed and actions

taken around the EP elections. We outline this information and Meta’s approach to elections across the following pillars:

- 1) Utilising and deploying our policies, and our overall content moderation efforts, to remove policy-violating content and help keep people safe on our platforms
- 2) Our election risk management processes
- 3) Cooperation with external stakeholders
- 4) Tools to support civic engagement
- 5) Preventing interference and disinformation
- 6) Reducing the spread of misinformation
- 7) Safeguards and transparency efforts related to political advertising
- 8) Responsible approach to Generative AI

Unless otherwise specified, data provided herein covers the period of May 7 – June 23, 2024, capturing one month prior to, and two weeks following, the electoral period.

1. Utilising and Deploying our Policies, and our Overall Content Moderation Efforts, to Remove Policy-Violating Content and Help Keep People Safe on our Platforms

Community Standards and Guidelines Relevant to Elections:

The [Facebook Community Standards](#) and the [Instagram Community Guidelines](#) establish strict rules about content that can and cannot be posted to Facebook and Instagram. These policies cover voter interference, voter fraud, electoral violence, and misinformation, among other categories such as hate speech, coordinating harm and promoting crime, and bullying and harassment. They have been refined over many years, by partnering with academics, civil society, and third-party fact-checkers to find the appropriate balance between protecting people and protecting freedom of expression. These policies are regularly reviewed, and they are available to the public.

Meta removes misinformation where it is likely to directly contribute to the risk of imminent physical harm. Meta partners with independent experts who possess knowledge and expertise to assess the truth of the content and whether it is likely to directly contribute to the risk of imminent harm.¹

¹ <https://transparency.meta.com/policies/community-standards/misinformation/>

Meta also removes misinformation that is likely to directly contribute to the risk of interfering with people’s ability to participate in elections. For example, Meta removes incorrect information about dates, locations, times, and methods for voting, including incorrect candidate numbers; offers to buy or sell votes; and incorrect information about who can vote, qualifications for voting, or whether a vote will be counted.

Meta’s Advertising Standards:

[Meta’s Advertising Standards](#) provide policy detail and guidance on the types of ad content we allow and the types of ad content we prohibit. When advertisers place an order, each ad is reviewed against our policies. Our Advertising Standards also provide guidance on advertiser behaviour that may result in advertising restrictions being placed on a Business Account or its assets (an ad account, Page, or user account).

Advertisers running ads across Meta technologies must follow our Facebook Community Standards and our Advertising Standards. In addition, advertisers on Instagram must also follow our Instagram Community Guidelines.

Ads about social issues, elections, or politics are subject to further requirements; see [Section 7](#) for additional information.

Enforcing Meta’s Policies through Content Moderation:

As part of efforts to enforce Meta’s terms of service, policies, standards, and guidelines – a practice known more broadly as content moderation – Meta uses a combination of human review and technology. Every day, Meta removes millions of pieces of content and accounts on Facebook and Instagram because of policy violations. In most cases, this happens automatically, using technology to detect, restrict, and remove content and accounts that go against Meta policies. In other cases, our technology selects content for human review. Our review teams review a blend of content surfaced by our technology as well as user reports. Our technology also supports the review teams by prioritising the most critical content to be reviewed, based on severity, virality, and likelihood of a violation. High-severity content is content with the potential for offline harm (e.g., posts related to terrorism and suicide), and viral content is content that is spreading quickly and has the potential to reach a large audience. Our technology prioritises this content for review in order to prevent as much harm as possible.

As shown in the following tables, in the month leading up to and including the electoral period, across Facebook and Instagram in the EU, Meta removed over 550,000 pieces of content for violating our Bullying and Harassment policies, over 660,000 pieces of content for violating our Hate Speech policies, and more than 370,000 pieces of content

under our Violence and Incitement policies. The majority of violating content was removed by our automated systems prior to any users viewing it, and before even being reported by users.

Removal Actions

“Removal Actions” refers to the number of pieces of non-paid content (such as posts, photos, videos, or comments) we remove for violating our policies.

The tables below show the Removal Actions for content per Member State on Facebook, and subsequently for Instagram, covering the period of May 7 – June 23, 2024.

Member State	Facebook		
	Bullying and Harassment Content Removal Actions	Hate Speech Content Removal Actions	Violence and Incitement Content Removal Actions
Austria	Over 2,600	Over 5,100	Over 570
Belgium	Over 6,800	Over 7,800	Over 4,400
Bulgaria	Over 2,100	Over 1,700	Less than 500
Croatia	Over 4,000	Over 1,200	Over 770
Cyprus	Over 1,200	Over 1,200	Less than 500
Czech Republic	Over 9,100	Over 5,200	Over 2,100
Denmark	Over 4,300	Over 4,200	Over 2,300
Estonia	Less than 500	Over 1,500	Less than 500
Finland	Over 3,500	Over 6,700	Over 1,800
France	Over 29,000	Over 59,000	Over 24,000
Germany	Over 25,000	Over 52,000	Over 5,900
Greece	Over 7,800	Over 6,900	Over 1,300
Hungary	Over 12,000	Over 13,000	Over 2,100
Ireland	Over 3,800	Over 1,600	Over 2,000
Italy	Over 50,000	Over 62,000	Over 52,000
Latvia	Over 700	Over 2,000	Less than 500
Lithuania	Over 2,100	Over 2,600	Over 650
Luxembourg	Less than 500	Less than 500	Less than 500
Malta	Less than 500	Less than 500	Less than 500
Netherlands	Over 9,700	Over 5,000	Over 5,600
Poland	Over 15,000	Over 14,000	Over 4,600
Portugal	Over 8,500	Over 5,600	Over 3,800
Romania	Over 8,600	Over 3,400	Over 820
Slovakia	Over 3,800	Over 4,900	Over 730
Slovenia	Over 1,000	Over 550	Less than 500
Spain	Over 22,000	Over 38,000	Over 20,000
Sweden	Over 6,000	Over 4,200	Over 1,600
Total	Over 240,000	Over 310,000	Over 140,000

Member State	Instagram		
	Bullying and Harassment Content Removal Actions	Hate Speech Content Removal Actions	Violence and Incitement Content Removal Actions
Austria	Over 7,000	Over 7,600	Over 1,600
Belgium	Over 8,400	Over 5,300	Over 4,600
Bulgaria	Over 5,000	Over 1,900	Over 1,200
Croatia	Over 4,300	Over 1,700	Over 750
Cyprus	Over 2,200	Over 1,300	Over 1,400
Czech Republic	Over 13,000	Over 6,900	Over 2,700
Denmark	Over 5,900	Over 2,600	Over 1,200
Estonia	Over 850	Over 1,200	Less than 500
Finland	Over 5,700	Over 3,700	Over 1,400
France	Over 20,000	Over 30,000	Over 31,000
Germany	Over 61,000	Over 86,000	Over 14,000
Greece	Over 10,000	Over 5,300	Over 2,500
Hungary	Over 6,400	Over 3,200	Over 1,000
Ireland	Over 7,400	Over 3,100	Over 3,300
Italy	Over 31,000	Over 75,000	Over 61,000
Latvia	Over 1,000	Over 1,100	Less than 500
Lithuania	Over 1,500	Over 1,200	Less than 500
Luxembourg	Less than 500	Less than 500	Less than 500
Malta	Over 820	Less than 500	Less than 500
Netherlands	Over 22,000	Over 9,000	Over 6,900
Poland	Over 25,000	Over 20,000	Over 4,500
Portugal	Over 7,300	Over 5,400	Over 13,000
Romania	Over 13,000	Over 5,900	Over 2,300
Slovakia	Over 4,600	Over 2,100	Over 900
Slovenia	Over 1,600	Over 640	Less than 500
Spain	Over 29,000	Over 63,000	Over 69,000
Sweden	Over 12,000	Over 7,400	Over 2,800
Total	Over 310,000	Over 350,000	Over 230,000

Proactive Rate

“[Proactive Rate](#)” shows the percentage of all non-paid content that we found and actioned before users reported them to us.

The table below shows the Proactive Rate for content in the EU covering the period of May 7 – June 23, 2024.

Policy	Proactive Rate for Facebook and Instagram Combined
Bullying and Harassment Community Standard	79%
Hate Speech Community Standard	89%
Violence and Incitement Community Standard	95%

Views on Removed Content

“Views on Removed Content” refers to the number of times that non-paid content was viewed before it was removed for violating our policies across Facebook and Instagram.

The table below expresses the percentage of EU content removal actions, by policy, across Facebook and Instagram, that received a number of views globally within the range defined in the table columns.

Policy	0 overall views	1-10 overall views	11-100 overall views	101 - 1,000 overall views	1,001 - 10,000 overall views	More than 10,000 overall views
Bullying and Harassment Community Standard	69%	11%	11%	6%	2%	1%
Hate Speech Community Standard	71%	16%	7%	4%	2%	0%
Violence and Incitement Community Standard	61%	24%	8%	5%	2%	0%

2. Our Election Risk Management Processes

A Cross-Company, Multi-Expertise Team:

We have a dedicated team responsible for driving Meta's cross-company election integrity efforts, leveraging experts from a full range of business functions to foster a holistic approach to tackling election-related risks. Teams include intelligence, data science, product and engineering, research, operations, content and public policy, and legal teams.

For elections with the scale and complexity of the EP elections, these experts are brought together a year in advance of the election date to assess risk, and identify and initiate mitigation strategies across our family of apps and services. This cross-functional team executes proactive risk mitigation strategies in continuous coordination and responds to issues as they arise, intensifying activity as election day approaches. These efforts culminate in an Elections Operations Centre, which brings together this team of experts to tackle risks and threats as they emerge in real time around voting days.

For the 2024 EP elections, we began focused preparation in June 2023, with our expert teams conducting a risk assessment to provide an overview of regional and country-specific risks across a set of problem areas relevant to the elections. The risk assessment served to define overarching priorities, but above all, it informed mitigations that needed to be in place to respond to identified risks. Our teams continued assessing and addressing risks around the voting days through our Elections Operations Centre which was set up in Meta's Dublin Office.

Our Risk Mitigation Strategies:

As mentioned above, during our election risk assessment process, our internal teams run country-level assessments on certain problem areas that are relevant to elections, including civic risks, hostile speech, misinformation, adversarial threats, and political advertising.

For the EP elections, our mitigation efforts especially focused on combating adversarial threats such as the Russian-origin network known as Doppelganger; political advertisements violating our policies; and the spread of misinformation, including violating content generated through GenAI.

We deployed mitigation measures to tackle risks that were flagged across all of the problem areas. While some of these policies, tools, and processes have been deployed

over many years based on previous experience, we continuously improve these measures to make sure they remain responsive to risks as they emerge, as well as external feedback.

3. Cooperation with External Stakeholders

Meta engages with a full range of external stakeholders to inform our processes and procedures as part of day-to-day business, and this practice continued during our election preparation. Meta values the networks and channels we have with our external stakeholders to work together in identifying risks on our platforms, and as such, we have welcomed many of the Election Guidelines recommending cooperation and points of contact with national authorities, civil society organisations, and others.

Below, we outline in particular our engagement with the European Commission, as well as authorities and partners at the member state level.

Engagement with the European Commission:

Pre-Election Engagements:

In the lead up to the EP elections, Meta participated in the [Stress Test exercise](#) organised by the European Commission on April 24, 2024 (focused on threat ideation)², as well as three subsequent online technical roundtables also with the Commission on May 17, June 3, and July 10, 2024. Meta welcomed the opportunity to provide comments on its efforts to prepare for the EP elections and to learn from and engage with other industry players, Digital Services Coordinators, civil society organisations, and fact-checkers on their preparation and capacity to tackle specific risks related to the elections, including information operations, misinformation, and other cyber threats. These regular exchanges helped strengthen communication with other stakeholders, enabling a faster response and cooperation in case of major incidents. The multi-stakeholder and multi-pronged approach were central in our election readiness work, regularly integrating feedback from the Commission and lessons learned from the direct discussions undertaken at these engagements.

² This was a simulation exercise with designated platforms, Digital Services Coordinators, and civil society organisations to test their readiness against election manipulation and interference in relation to the European election. See <https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-stress-tests-platforms-election-readiness-under-digital-services-act>.

Working Group on Elections & Rapid Response System:

Meta is also an active member of the EU Code of Practice (“CoP”) on Disinformation Taskforce’s Working Group on Elections and took part in its [Rapid Response System](#). To this end, Meta set up an email alias for Taskforce members as well as the European Commission to flag trends, and on-boarded the 16 organisations in the Working Group to a direct escalation channel to report content which poses serious or systemic concerns to the integrity of the electoral process and support its prompt review.

During the course of the electoral period, we received 14 reports through this channel (reporting 58 pieces of content across Facebook and Instagram), all of which were reviewed, discussed within the Working Group, and closed. We took action on 32 of those pieces of content as follows: we restricted access to 1 piece of content on the basis of local law in the jurisdiction it was alleged to be unlawful, removed 6 assets for violations of our policies, enqueued 9 pieces of content to third-party fact-checkers, and removed 16 unlabelled social issue, electoral, or political ads (more information on political advertising is available in [Section 7](#)). Most cases were closed within 24 hours of receipt.

CrowdTangle:

Meta deployed 27 live displays for each Member State on [CrowdTangle](#) for the EP Elections. These displays were publicly accessible.

Engagement with National Authorities and Civil Society:

National Election Authorities:

For the EP elections, Meta conducted outreach and established communication channels with national election authorities across all 27 member states. We temporarily onboarded 23 national election authorities as well as other competent bodies to a dedicated reporting channel, allowing them to directly report content that may violate our policies or election laws, and we delivered a training session on this channel and on our elections-related policies.

In the lead-up to the elections, Meta organised deep dive sessions with the relevant national authorities in France, Germany, and Poland, as well as with the European Commission team in charge of the EU CoP on Disinformation to discuss our enforcement efforts against the Russian Influence Operation Doppelganger. We also used these meetings to share Meta’s [Q1 2024](#) Adversarial Threat Report where we include a public, machine-readable list of threat indicators to contribute to the security community’s efforts to detect and counter malicious activity elsewhere on the internet. More

information on the report and our actions to prevent interference and disinformation is available in [Section 5](#).

Digital Service Coordinators:

As of August 2024, Meta has onboarded 13 DSCs, giving them access to our government reporting channels.

Meta has conducted outreach and delivered comprehensive training to 16 formally appointed Digital Service Coordinators:

Appointed Digital Services Coordinator	Member State
Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni (Agcom)	Italy
Autoridade nacional de comunicações (Anacom)	Portugal
The National Authority for Management and Regulation in Communications (ANCOM)	Romania
Autorité de régulation de la communication audiovisuelle et numérique (Arcom)	France
Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM)	Netherlands
Belgian Institute for Postal Services and Telecommunications (BIPT)	Belgium
Bundesnetzagentur für Elektrizität, Gas, Telekommunikation, Post und Eisenbahnen (BNetzA)	Germany
Communications Regulatory Authority (CRA)	Lithuania
Consumer Protection and Technical Regulatory Authority	Estonia
Consumer Rights Protection Centre Republic of Latvia (PTAC)	Latvia
KommAustria	Austria
Konkurrence- og Forbrugerstyrelsen (The Competition and Consumer Authority)	Denmark
Malta Communications Authority	Malta
National Media and Infocommunications Authority (NMHH)	Hungary
Swedish Post and Telecom Authority (PTS)	Sweden
Traficom	Finland

We provided step-by-step guidance to help the DSCs navigate the “Single Point of Contact” (SPOC) Form for EU Member States’ authorities, the EU Commission, the EU Board for Digital Services, as well as the onboarding process, where required, in order to access the relevant contact forms.

Political Parties at Member State Level:

Meta organised 34 training sessions and office hours in 21 countries on our policies and products ahead of the election with government organisations, political parties, electoral institutions, and civil society organisations. We participated in the EU Parliament Social Media Conference organised by the EU Directorate-General for Communication, which was attended by around 200 Members of the EU Parliament and their assistants. During the conference, we shared our insights on best practices for election campaigning and emphasised the importance of integrity and safety. We also provided information on where to find support. We additionally launched an EU Election Center (<https://www.facebook.com/government-nonprofits/eu>) in all 24 EU official languages to support our government partners.

Third-Party Fact-Checkers (3PFC):

Meta has the largest fact-checking network of any provider, including 29 independent fact-checking organisations across the EU, covering 23 languages. Please see further information on our collaboration and investments for the EP elections in [Section 6](#).

Legal Removal Requests Article 16 DSA:

Meta also has notice mechanisms in place in accordance with Article 16 DSA, allowing users, individuals, and entities to notify Facebook and Instagram of information on the service that they allege to be illegal content. This mechanism is available directly from the piece of content and is easily accessible. It is also available from the Help Center.³

Reporting and Enforcement around the EP Elections:

During the course of the electoral period, we received 358 reports from national authorities and civil society through our government reporting channels and the dedicated reporting channel described above (reporting 769 pieces of content across Facebook and Instagram). As a result, we removed 265 pieces of content for going against our policies, and restricted access to 5 pieces of content on the basis of local law in the jurisdiction it was alleged to be unlawful. The remaining content was found to be non-violating against our policies and/or local law, and therefore no action was taken. The median turnaround time from report submission to action was under 13 hours.

³ The 'Legal Removal Request' form is available for Facebook at <https://www.facebook.com/help/2214522878809427> and for Instagram at <https://help.instagram.com/874680996209917>.

4. Tools to Support Civic Engagement for Users

Voter Information Units and Election Day Information Features:

We remain focused on providing users with reliable election information while combating misinformation across languages. That is why we continue to connect people with details about the election for their Member State through in-app notifications, where legally permitted.

We proactively point users to reliable information on the electoral process through in-app 'Voter Information Units' and 'Election Day Information'. These are notices at the top of feed on both Facebook and Instagram, reminding people of the day they can vote in their Member States and re-directing them to local authoritative sources on how and where to vote. For the EP elections - where it was legally permitted to do so - the 'Voter Information Unit' launched on May 30 and the 'Election Day Information' feature ran between June 6 and 9 according to Member State voting procedure.

Users in the EU engaged these in-app notifications more than 41 million times on Facebook and more than 58 million times on Instagram. For a full breakdown of the reach these in-app notifications had on EU users, see below:

	Facebook Clicks	Instagram Clicks
Voter Information Unit	23.4 million	32.5 million
Election Day Information	18.0 million	26.4 million

Safety Reminders:

Ahead of the EP elections, Meta sent in-Feed notifications on Facebook and Instagram to people who may face increased levels of risk online about how to protect their accounts.

High-profile accounts, such as accounts from candidates running for the EP elections, were shown a notification at the top of their Feed, directing them to resources that explain how to do things like set up two factor authentication, review their security settings, or set up Hidden Words - a feature on Instagram that automatically sends direct messaging requests containing offensive words, phrases, and emojis to a hidden folder so users don't have to see them.

These features better protect accounts from unauthorised access and identity fraud, and help promote safer, more secure interactions on Meta's apps.

Media Literacy Efforts:

These features were complemented by several supporting media literacy efforts. This included:

- A campaign with the [European Fact-Checking Standards Network \(EFCSN\)](#) on how to spot AI-generated and digitally altered media (see [Section 6](#) for further detail).
- Supporting the [European Disability Forum](#) (EDF) with a two-phased campaign implementation:
 - **Phase one** focusing on content development for an “accessible masterclass on media literacy – for politics and life” that the EDF organised during the end of May as a recorded online event just before the Elections. This content was based on [Meta’s Media Literacy module](#) and according to the EDF had around 800 plays at the time of writing this report.
 - **Phase two** comprising the provision of ad credits to support an awareness campaign on media literacy to run in September / October, putting a spotlight on the masterclass event and continuing investment in this important space even beyond the electoral period.
- The provision of ad credit support for the European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services’ (ERGA) awareness-raising campaign against disinformation. The campaign resulted in over 87 million impressions, with reach to over 64 million users.
- Organising a CEE Digital Awareness Day, which was a flagship activation in CEE to promote media literacy through partnerships with civic society and third party fact-checkers. It gathered over 80 experts from 17 CEE countries to reflect on best practices for shaping civic attitudes and promoting critical consumption of information using our platforms.
- In addition, we showcased the European Digital Media Observatory’s [#BeElectionSmart website](#) in leadership posts and in our [elections hub](#).

Other Efforts:

Meta also supported other initiatives at the local level. For example, Meta partnered with the German Federal Returning Officer (Germany’s independent electoral body) to support their get-out-the-vote campaign. The campaign resulted in over 8 million impressions, with reach to over 4.7 million users. In France, Meta engaged in two campaigns to combat misinformation and prevent electoral interference. This included:

- A collaboration with the local fact-checking partner AFP Fact Check, producing a Reel video featuring popular French astronaut Thomas Pesquet reviewing a series of pictures and videos that had been shared online as hoaxes. He explains best practices and tools people should leverage when faced with a piece of news that seems unlikely. According to AFP, the videos resulted in nearly 2.5 million views on Instagram and Facebook.
- Participation in a multi-platform campaign operated by the French partner NGO Génération Numérique, consisting of a series of educational short videos gathering tips and recommendations on avoiding becoming a victim of misinformation. According to Génération Numérique, the videos reached over 200k users and generated nearly 300k impressions on Instagram and Facebook alone.

5. Preventing Interference and Disinformation

Meta invests a huge amount of effort and resources to protect discourse and discussion online - not just during election periods, but at all times. We take a variety of approaches that are aimed at protecting the authenticity of debate and discussion on our services, and enabling people to create a space where they can trust the people and communities they interact with. Below we provide an overview of our continuous efforts to prevent interference and disinformation, as well as key enforcement actions taken so far this year around the election timeframe. Our expert teams used these enforcements and learnings to inform our elections risk management and mitigations ahead of the EP elections, and worked closely with external stakeholders to share information, as described in [Section 3](#).

Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior:

Since 2017 we've been transparent about the approaches we've taken to counter attempts to manipulate civic and non-civic discourse online. We use a combination of policies, tools, expert teams, and partnerships to detect and remove networks of Inauthentic Behaviour (IB) and Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior (CIB). Our specialised global teams in this space are part of our cross-functional elections team, and work to identify and disrupt specific threats targeting public discourse globally, including ahead of major elections.

This space is highly adversarial and we have continued to iterate on our approach as we track and disrupt these campaigns. Our teams of expert investigators work with engineers to feed the insights learned from investigating these networks globally into automated detection systems to proactively detect other bad actors engaged in these

and similar violating behaviors, including networks that attempt to come back after they were taken down. When we take action against networks found to be engaged in CIB, we take a systemic mitigation approach and attempt to remove the entirety of the network engaged in this behaviour, aiming to disrupt further attempts at the source.

A major enforcement milestone was marked in 2022 as Meta had disrupted more than 200 networks for violating our CIB policy. These networks came from 68 countries and operated in at least 42 languages. Meta also continues to update our inauthentic behavior policy to improve our ability to counter new tactics and more quickly act against the spectrum of deceptive practices – both CIB and other inauthentic tactics (often used by financially motivated actors) seen on the platforms. We continue to report publicly on the efforts to disrupt CIB and detect and remove fake accounts and spam through our Community Standards Enforcement Report, [Newsroom](#) posts, and our Quarterly Adversarial Threats report.⁴

CIB Enforcement and Findings from our Efforts to Prevent Adversarial Threats:

In August 2024, we shared our [quarterly Adversarial Threat Report for Q2 2024](#). The report included information on networks which have targeted the EU, including three CIB networks originating from Russia and one from Vietnam, and Doppelganger. Below, we summarise key takeaways related to these networks and actions taken, with further detail available directly in the Q2 report.

- **Russia:**
 - We removed 20 Facebook accounts, 14 Pages, and nine accounts on Instagram for violating our policy against CIB. This network originated in Russia and targeted primarily English- and French-speaking audiences globally. This operation centred around fictitious news websites hosted in the regions targeted which continue to publish stories that resemble authentic articles from across the internet, including by mainstream media. These fictitious news brands had presence across several internet services, including ours, YouTube, Telegram, and X (formerly Twitter) to backstop these entities and their fake contributors so they appear more legitimate and can withstand scrutiny by platforms and researchers. For English-speaking audiences, this campaign posted primarily about diminishing support for Ukraine in the West. We removed this activity before the network was able to build authentic audiences on our apps.

⁴ Meta, '[Community Standards Enforcement Report](#)', and Meta, '[Adversarial Threats Report](#)', Meta Transparency Center.

- We removed 43 Facebook accounts and 85 Pages for violating our policy against CIB. This network originated in Russia and targeted primarily Ukraine, Moldova, and Ukrainians living in Europe, and to a lesser extent France and Germany. This campaign appears to be an unsuccessful attempt at a ‘three-dimensional chess’ campaign to undermine Ukraine while pretending to support it. On the one hand they assumed a seemingly pro-Ukraine stance by calling for more weapons from Europe, but they also highlighted Ukrainian battle casualties, called for harsher punishment for Ukrainians who avoid conscription, and demanded Presidential elections in Ukraine in 2024. It combined online efforts to establish fictitious news and civic entities across the internet with amplifying real-world stunts in France, Germany, and Poland related to the war in Ukraine as if they are authentic grassroots developments in Europe. This operation failed to gain traction among authentic audiences on our apps in the short time it was active before we disrupted it. We continue to detect and block their recidivist attempts to come back.
- We removed 12 Facebook accounts, 32 Pages, five Groups, and three accounts on Instagram for violating our policy against CIB. This network originated in Russia and targeted primarily Ukraine, and to a much lesser extent Poland and the broader European Union and the United States. It focused on undermining Ukraine and its support in the West. Efforts targeted at the EU included posting in English about Western aid provided to Ukraine, war casualties among Ukrainian soldiers, claims that Ukraine’s government has failed to protect its people, and criticism of the West for providing lethal weapons to Ukraine and for allowing war crimes in Gaza. We removed this activity before the network was able to build authentic audiences on our apps.
- **Doppelganger:** Doppelganger continues to be a “smash-and-grab” effort expending a large amount of resources in the face of a very high detection rate and daily loss of assets. Meta’s persistent enforcement efforts against the campaign have forced its operators to adapt and make tactical changes to evade takedowns, degrading the quality of their operations on our platforms. The Q2 report shares a detailed assessment and breakdown of Doppelganger’s behaviour, and is the 8th quarterly Adversarial Threat Report which has provided detail on tactics and

behaviour of this network.⁵ It also includes nearly 300 threat indicators added to our industry's largest repository of 6,000+ indicators related to this threat actor. We shared in our August 2024 report that since our prior update in May, we have detected and removed over 5,000 accounts and Pages.

Our teams are engaged in daily efforts to find and block Doppelganger's attempts to acquire new accounts and Pages, run ads, and share links to its websites and redirect domains, before these are ever shared on our apps. Here is a summary of some of our latest findings and actions:

Spoofing websites of legitimate media expanded to less political outlets: In the last couple of months we've seen them begin spoofing websites of primarily non-political and entertainment news outlets and online magazines, in addition to health and science websites. We added these new spoof websites and hundreds of redirect domains to our public GitHub [repository](#) to enable broader detection and research across the internet.

Attempts to seed links to websites restarted on our apps after a pause: At the time of our last [report](#) in May 2024, we had seen a major shift in tactics on our platform, unmatched by activity on other services. It included a pause in seeding links to spoofing news organisations and government entities on our apps, including redirects. Since May 2024, Doppelganger has resumed its attempts at sharing links to its domains *but at a lower rate*. We blocked these latest URLs from being shared on our apps.

Repurposing compromised pages & accounts: We shared in our August 2024 threat report that, in addition to cycling through fake accounts which get quickly detected and removed, Doppelganger recently expanded their use of compromised accounts and Pages, likely in an attempt to stay afloat a bit longer by appearing more authentic. We continue to detect and block these attempts by using both automation and expert investigations monitoring for these changes in tactics.

Continuously degrading ad quality: As we noted in our May and August reports, Doppelganger is actively testing ways to avoid detection with the majority of ads being caught before they run or within hours after submission. We continue to incorporate our latest insights into our detection systems on the ongoing basis.

⁵ Prior Reports: [Adversarial Threat Report](#), September 2022; [Recapping Our 2022 Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior Enforcements](#), December 2022; [Q4 2022 Adversarial Threat Report](#), February 2023; [Q2 2023 Adversarial Threat Report](#), August 2023; [Q3 2023 Adversarial Threat Report](#), November 2023; [Q4 2023 Adversarial Threat Report](#), February 2024; [Q1 2024 Adversarial Threat Report](#), May 2024; [Q2 2024 Adversarial Threat Report](#), August 2024.

These circumvention attempts are significantly degrading the quality of these ads, making them barely legible and irrelevant to the public discourse topics this operation has been pursuing since 2022.

- **Vietnam:** We removed 112 Facebook accounts, 65 Pages, and 49 accounts on Instagram for violating our policy against CIB. This network originated in Vietnam and targeted primarily Lebanon, the US, UK, and France, and to a lesser extent Saudi Arabia and Qatar. They ran four regional campaigns, one of which was a French-language effort targeted at France. It posted about the alleged alliance between Qatar and Iran, the importance of retaining traditional French values and secularism, and criticised Shia Islam and Qatari investments in Europe.

In addition, in our Quarterly Adversarial Threat report for [Q1 2024](#) (published May 2024) we provided information on two CIB networks relevant to the EU, one originating in Croatia and a second network with an unknown origin:

- **Croatia:** We removed 104 Facebook accounts and 39 Pages which targeted Croatian audiences about issues related to the national elections, economy, successes of the HDZ-led government, as well as critical commentary about opposition figures, the President of Croatia and his Social Democratic Party.
- **Unknown origin network:** We removed 1,326 Facebook accounts, 80 Pages, and one Group which targeted audiences in Moldova and Madagascar. This network posted primarily in Romanian, Russian and Malagasy, and also in French about news and current events in Moldova and Madagascar. In Moldova, they posted about the Gagauzia region, public figures including Ilan Shor, a sanctioned Moldovan politician, and Marina Tauber, a member of the Şor Party, in addition to criticising the incumbent government and its efforts towards EU integration, including with parody videos about the current President.

Some key takeaways we noticed in our Q1 2024 threat report were that, while public discourse ahead of the EU parliamentary elections focused primarily on foreign threats, including from Doppelganger, the majority of the EU-focused inauthentic behaviour we disrupted ahead of the EU elections in 2024 were domestic in nature. This includes both CIB activity (such as the Croatia example detailed above and in the report) and simpler inauthentic clusters we removed in Europe, including in France, Germany, Poland, and Italy. These clusters and networks had small numbers of assets, primarily targeted audiences in their own countries, were more focused on local elections rather than the EU parliamentary elections, and many were linked to individuals associated with local campaigns or candidates. Where we did see threats by foreign actors, including Doppelganger and a handful of other clusters, they were primarily focused on

undermining support for Ukraine in the EU member states, rather than directly targeting the parliamentary elections. These groups often deployed tactics which included inauthentic amplification of authentic accounts or Pages of domestic politicians through likes, shares, and comments to make them appear more popular than they were. We did not see evidence of these clusters gaining much traction among authentic audiences.

Removing Fake Accounts:

In line with our commitment to authenticity, we don't allow people to misrepresent who they are, by using fake accounts, impersonating others, or engaging in behaviours designed to enable other harms, including electoral interference.

The ability to detect and remove fake accounts has been improving over the years, and there has been a general decline in the volume of fake accounts found on our platforms since 2019. In 2023 alone, Meta detected and removed 2.6 billion fake accounts on Facebook, 98.95% of which were proactively detected and removed by Meta before they were even reported.⁶

Labelling State-Controlled Media:

In line with our commitment to transparency and authenticity, we label content on Facebook and Instagram so that people know when it is from a publication that may be under the editorial control of a government. After we applied new and stronger enforcement to Russian state-controlled media, including blocking them in the EU and globally demoting their posts, the most recent [research](#) by Graphika shows posting volumes on their pages went down 55% and engagement levels were down 94% compared to pre-war levels, while “more than half of all Russian state media assets had stopped posting altogether.”

6. Reducing the Spread of Misinformation

Meta takes several steps to reduce the spread of misinformation both during and outside of electoral periods. These steps include some measures already mentioned in this report such as deploying our community standards, limiting the distribution of problematic content, and working closely with our network of independent third-party fact-checkers (“3PFC”).

⁶ Meta, [‘Community Standards Enforcement Report’](#), Meta Transparency Centre.

Meta's Approach to Fact-Checking:

As described in [Section 1](#), Meta removes content on Facebook and Instagram that potentially interferes with voting. For content not removed for violating our Community Standards or Community Guidelines, Meta also works with 3PFCs to address misinformation.⁷ When 3PFCs rate a post, we apply an informative label and may reduce its reach on Facebook and Instagram.

The focus of Meta's fact-checking program is to identify and address viral false information, particularly clear hoaxes that have no basis in fact. 3PFCs prioritise provably false claims that are timely, trending, and consequential. Meta applies a warning label to content found to be false information by 3PFCs. Once 3PFCs have determined that a piece of content contains false information, Meta uses technology to identify near-identical versions of that content across Facebook and Instagram. We use our technology to detect content that is the same or almost exactly the same as that rated by 3PFCs, and add notices to that content as well. We generally do not add notices to content that makes a similar claim rated by 3PFCs, if the content is not identical. This is because small differences in how a claim is phrased might change whether it is true or false.

People who still see this content in their feeds will see it with a label and a link directing them to more information from the 3PFC.

When users attempt to share content which has a fact-checked label, they are shown a warning from Meta that the content has been fact-checked by 3PFCs. This friction point deters users from sharing the content and is a helpful tool in limiting the spread of misinformation. See page 26 for further information.

In addition, advertisers cannot run ads on either Facebook or Instagram that include content debunked by 3PFCs or that violates our Community Standards.⁸

Meta's Third-Party Fact-Checking Programme in the European Union:

In May 2024, Meta [announced](#) that it now accepts the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) as fulfilling a prerequisite for joining Meta's Third Party Fact-Checking Programme for Europe-based fact-checking organisations, in recognition of the strong standards it has established for the European fact-checking community.

⁷ Meta, '[How fact-checking works](#)', Meta Transparency Centre.

⁸ For further detail, see [Meta's Advertising Standards](#).

Meta has a large fact-checking network: in Europe, we partner with 46 3PFCs (45 at the time of the EP elections), covering 36 languages. This includes 29 partners in the EU covering 23 different languages – the largest network of any platform. A full list of Meta’s 3PFC partners for January – June 2024 can be found in the publicly available ‘empowering the fact-checking community’ chapter of the EU CoP on Disinformation transparency report from Meta.⁹

Efforts Ahead of the EP Elections:

In the lead-up to the EP elections, we increased our cooperation with 3PFCs in several ways, including expansion of the fact-checking program to include three new partners – Les Surligneurs (France), Demagog.sk (Slovakia), and Factcheck.bg (Bulgaria) – and provided new tools and training with a focus on our election-related policies. We increased fact-checking partners’ capacity to rate and review content during the elections. We used keyword detection to group potential misinformation content related to the EP election in one place, making it easy for fact-checkers to find, and we organised refresher sessions on our policies, which were attended by 21 organisations.

Gen AI Project with the EFCSN:

Meta funded and supported the EFCSN in a [new project](#) ahead of the EP elections focused on identifying AI-generated or digitally altered media misinformation. The goal of this project was to improve the skills and capabilities of the European fact-checking community in debunking and countering AI-generated misinformation, facilitate common standards in addressing and fact-checking AI content, and raise the wider public's awareness on this type of misinformation through media literacy campaigns. The results of this project included:

- A series of 5 workshops with experts that gave training to over 200 individual fact-checkers across Europe.
- A [media literacy campaign](#) which included a one-pager, explainer video, and infographics that was published in 27 different languages across Europe and reached a total of 12.7 million impressions.
- Facilitating the development of common standards in addressing and fact-checking AI content, and informing relevant stakeholders on the state of AI-generated misinformation across EU markets.

⁹ Reports from code signatories, including Meta, are available on the CoP on Disinformation Transparency Centre. See <https://disinfocode.eu/>.

Refresher Training for 3PFCs:

In advance of the European Parliament elections, Meta launched a refresher training series for partners in their European programme attended by 21 organisations. The aim of these trainings was to ensure that 3PFCs were up to date on the latest programme policies and product updates. This training series included:

- A misinformation policy training, which touched on our latest policies and provided guidance on reviewing Gen AI content.
- A product refresher training reviewing the fact-checking tool and workflows, which included going over the various labels 3PFCs can use.

Access to the Meta Content Library:

Meta developed and deployed the [Meta Content Library](#) (MCL), a suite of tools that provides eligible individuals and entities access to comprehensive, publicly-accessible content across Facebook and Instagram. Meta provided all 3PFCs working on Meta fact-checking programs in the EU with access to the MCL, during the first 6 months of 2024.

Fact-checkers can use MCL to analyse public content, identify misinformation in their country/language, and study how it is spreading. It enables:

- Searching public posts across Facebook is easy with comprehensive sorting and filtering options. Post results can be filtered by language, view count, media type, content producer and more.
- Multimedia: Photos, videos, and reels are available for dynamic search, exploration and analysis.
- Producer lists: customizable collections of content producers can be used to refine search results.

Impact Around the EP Elections:

During the week of the elections, we saw a focus in the independent 3PFCs' articles on false claims about Ukraine and Russia, climate change, and misinformation about how to vote or how results would be announced.

We saw positive results of our efforts to combat this and other misinformation. For example, [Fundación Maldita's report](#) estimated that over 88% of the election-related

misinformation on Facebook, and over 70% on Instagram, received visible action. This out-performed all other social media providers similarly assessed by Fundación Maldita.

As shown in the following tables, as a result of our misinformation policies and measures, we treated over 11 million pieces of content on Facebook, and over 300,000 pieces of content on Instagram, with fact checks in the month leading up to and including the electoral period. On average, 48% of people who started to share fact-checked content on Facebook, and 44% on Instagram, did not complete this action after receiving a warning from Meta that the content has been fact-checked, demonstrating the impact of labelling efforts in reducing the spread of misinformation on both platforms. In addition, we removed over 3,000 ads for violating our misinformation policies. Further detail is provided in the tables below.

Content Treated with Misinformation Labels Around the EP Elections:

The below table shows information on content viewed by EU users which was treated with misinformation labels on Facebook and Instagram between May 7 – June 23, 2024, as well as attempted reshares.

Member State	Facebook		Instagram	
	Content treated with fact checks on Facebook due to violating assessment by 3PFCs	% of reshares attempted that were not completed on treated content - Facebook	Content treated with fact checks on Instagram due to violating assessment by 3PFCs	% of reshares attempted that were not completed on treated content - Instagram
Austria	Over 310,000	44%	Over 21,000	44%
Belgium	Over 430,000	46%	Over 25,000	41%
Bulgaria	Over 300,000	52%	Over 9,400	47%
Cyprus	Over 200,000	45%	Over 9,700	39%
Croatia	Over 87,000	48%	Over 8,900	48%
Czech Republic	Over 290,000	34%	Over 14,000	43%
Denmark	Over 220,000	41%	Over 15,000	41%
Estonia	Over 38,000	38%	Over 4,200	43%
Finland	Over 83,000	39%	Over 13,000	40%
France	Over 1,800,000	57%	Over 60,000	44%
Germany	Over 1,800,000	44%	Over 90,000	43%

Greece	Over 450,000	51%	Over 21,000	47%
Hungary	Over 220,000	53%	Over 11,000	42%
Ireland	Over 250,000	43%	Over 24,000	39%
Italy	Over 1,900,000	53%	Over 70,000	48%
Latvia	Over 72,000	40%	Over 4,600	43%
Lithuania	Over 110,000	48%	Over 5,600	49%
Luxembourg	Over 40,000	45%	Over 4,200	48%
Malta	Over 37,000	56%	Over 3,800	32%
Netherlands	Over 460,000	39%	Over 40,000	41%
Poland	Over 880,000	42%	Over 27,000	46%
Portugal	Over 570,000	56%	Over 37,000	42%
Romania	Over 540,000	35%	Over 17,000	45%
Slovakia	Over 200,000	45%	Over 9,000	39%
Slovenia	Over 100,000	38%	Over 6,000	44%
Spain	Over 1,500,000	55%	Over 73,000	48%
Sweden	Over 270,000	41%	Over 27,000	45%
Overall EU	Over 11,000,000	48%	Over 300,000	44%

Ads Removed for Misinformation Violations Around the EP Elections:

The below table shows information on ads removed across Facebook and Instagram between May 7 – June 23, 2024. This count is inclusive of the number of ads rejected during our ad review process prior to going live, as well as live ads which were removed, for violating our misinformation policies. Country is determined by inferred advertiser location at time of enforcement.

Member State	Ads Removed for Misinformation Violation across Facebook and Instagram Combined
Austria	Less than 50
Belgium	Less than 50
Bulgaria	About 50
Croatia	Less than 50
Cyprus	Less than 50

Czech Republic	Over 100
Denmark	Less than 50
Estonia	Less than 50
Finland	Less than 50
France	Over 350
Germany	Over 400
Greece	Over 50
Hungary	Over 50
Ireland	Less than 50
Italy	Over 600
Latvia	Over 100
Lithuania	Less than 50
Luxembourg	0
Malta	0
Netherlands	Over 500
Poland	Over 350
Portugal	Less than 50
Romania	Less than 50
Slovakia	Less than 50
Slovenia	Less than 50
Spain	Over 300
Sweden	Less than 50
Total	Over 3200

7. Safeguards and Transparency Efforts Related to Political Advertising

Meta has a range of measures in place in relation to political advertising and promoting transparency.

Defining Political Ads:

Meta utilises a broad definition for political advertising and our policy in this space applies to “all ads about social issues, elections, or politics” (“SIEP” ads) so that transparency obligations and other requirements can be imposed on a wide category of ads that could influence political discourse, including elections. This applies to any ad that:

- Is made by, on behalf of, or about a candidate for public office, a political figure, a political party, a political action committee or advocates for the outcome of an election to public office;
- Is about any election, referendum, or ballot initiative, including "get out the vote" or election information campaigns;
- Is about any social issue in any place where the ad is being run; or,
- Is regulated as political advertising.

Political Ads Transparency and Disclaimers:

As mentioned in Meta’s [Advertising Standards](#), Meta enforces our policies against all advertisers, and advertisers must not evade or attempt to evade our review process and enforcement actions.

In order to run SIEP ads in the EU, advertisers must meet several authenticity and transparency requirements, and complete the authorisation process required by Meta.¹⁰ Advertisers can only run SIEP ads in those countries where they are authorised. European Union institutions, registered European political parties, and official political groups qualify to run cross-border ads about social issues, elections, and politics across multiple EU Member States unless otherwise prohibited.

Advertisers must include a verified "Paid for by" disclaimer on these ads to show the entity or person responsible for running the ad across Meta technologies. The disclaimer is subject to [restrictions](#). Advertisers must also comply with all applicable laws and regulations, including but not limited to requirements involving: disclaimer, disclosure and ad labelling, blackout periods, foreign interference, spending limits, and reporting requirements.

If Meta detects an ad running without a disclaimer, it will be disapproved and added to the Ad Library (described below), and the advertiser will need to complete the authorization process. If Meta finds that an ad account, Page, user account, or business account is

¹⁰ Meta, '[Get authorised to run ads about social issues, elections or politics](#)', Meta Business Help Center.

evading the review process and enforcement actions, an advertiser may face advertising restrictions. Besides, advertisers must use authentic user accounts to set up business assets and run ads across Meta's technologies, and must not manage business assets that are connected to other abusive business assets or display behaviour similar to business assets that we've already taken down.

In addition to the disclaimers, Meta provides further transparency in relation to Political ads via Meta's [Ad Library](#). The Ad Library is a dedicated website which allows users to search all of the ads currently running across Meta technologies. All ads that are currently running on Meta technologies show: the ad content; the basic information, such as when the ad started running; and which advertiser is running it. Regarding ads about social issues, elections, or politics, the Ad Library shows: the ad content; the basic information, such as when the ad started running and which advertiser is running it; and additional transparency about spend, reach, and funding entities. Such ads remain in the Ad Library for seven years. Users can also preview the total amount spent on these ads by an advertiser and the targeting choices made, broken down by period.

If an ad violates our rules, the Ad Library in the EU (and associated territories) contains information on why it was rejected. We will display this information for disapproved ads for a period of one year after their last impression is delivered and seven years if the ad is about social issues, elections, or politics.

Additional Measures for the EP Elections:

In preparation for the EP Elections, Meta strengthened its ads policies around elections (this includes primary, general, special, and run-off elections). In January 2024, Meta expanded its prohibited election ads policy to Member States of the European Union to ban ads aiming to delegitimize the election process.¹¹

Ads targeting the European Union (EU) with the following content aren't allowed:

- Ads that discourage people from voting in an election. This includes ads that portray voting as useless/meaningless and/or advise people not to vote
- Ads that call into question the legitimacy of an upcoming or ongoing election
- Ads with premature claims of election victory

This prohibition includes ads that call into question the legitimacy of the methods and processes of elections, as well as their outcomes.

¹¹ Meta, '[Information on prohibited ads related to voting and ads about social issues, elections, or politics](#)', Meta Business Help Center.

This also includes ads about upcoming elections in current or future years, as well as ongoing elections that have not been finalised. We consider an election to be finalised when it has been certified and officials have been sworn into office.

SIEP Ads and Enforcement Around the EP Elections:

As a result of the above policies and measures, around the EP elections, we labelled over 400,000 SIEP ads in the EU, and we removed over 130,000 SIEP ads in the EU for non-compliance with Meta’s SIEP policy.

The below table shows information on the number of ads accepted and run with SIEP disclaimers as well as the number of ads removed for non-compliance with Meta’s SIEP policy in EU member states between May 7 – June 23, 2024. Country is determined by inferred advertiser location at time of enforcement.

Member State	Number of SIEP ads accepted & labelled on Facebook and Instagram combined	Number of SIEP ads removed for not complying with our SIEP ads policy on Facebook and Instagram combined
Austria	Over 9,500	Over 1,800
Belgium	Over 32,000	Over 6,500
Bulgaria	Over 5,200	Over 1,700
Croatia	Over 4,600	Over 550
Cyprus	Over 5,300	Over 2,600
Czech Republic	Over 9,400	Over 2,400
Denmark	Over 11,000	Over 2,100
Estonia	Over 1,400	Over 710
Finland	Over 7,300	Over 1,500
France	Over 9,300	Over 9,900
Germany	Over 36,000	Over 15,000
Greece	Over 11,000	Over 2,600
Hungary	Over 48,000	Over 6,500
Ireland	Over 9,700	Over 2,400
Italy	Over 71,000	Over 29,000
Latvia	Over 6,000	Over 4,900
Lithuania	Over 2,400	Over 1,100

Luxembourg	Over 510	Less than 500
Malta	Over 1,900	Over 1,300
Netherlands	Over 20,000	Over 3,500
Poland	Over 14,000	Over 11,000
Portugal	Over 2,500	Over 2,700
Romania	Over 58,000	Over 9,300
Slovakia	Over 8,600	Over 1,800
Slovenia	Over 1,400	Less than 500
Spain	Over 11,000	Over 7,400
Sweden	Over 15,000	Over 2,800
Total	Over 410,000	Over 130,000

8. Responsible Approach to Gen AI

Meta’s approach to responsible AI is another way that we are safeguarding the integrity of elections globally, including for elections in the EU. Below, we provide information on our approach and the volume of AI-labelled content in the EU around the EP elections.

Community Standards, Fact-Checking, and AI Labelling:

Meta’s Community Standards, Community Guidelines, and [Advertising Standards](#) apply to all content, including content generated by AI. AI-generated content is also eligible to be reviewed and rated by 3PFCs, whose [rating options](#) allow them to address various ways in which media content may mislead people, including but not limited to media that is created or edited by AI.

Meta labels photorealistic images created using Meta AI, as well as AI-generated images from Google, OpenAI, Microsoft, Adobe, Midjourney, and Shutterstock that users post to Facebook and Instagram.

Meta has begun labelling a wider range of video, audio, and image content when we detect industry-standard AI image indicators or when users disclose that they’re uploading AI-generated content. Meta requires people to use this disclosure and label tool when they post organic content with a photorealistic video or realistic-sounding audio that was digitally created or altered, and may apply penalties if they fail to do so. If Meta determines that digitally created or altered image, video, or audio content creates a

particularly high risk of materially deceiving the public on a matter of importance, we may add a more prominent label, so that people have more information and context.

Political Ads and Meta’s AI Disclosure Policy:

Meta announced in [November 2023](#) a disclosure policy to help people understand when a SIEP ad (as described in [Section 7](#)) on Facebook or Instagram has been digitally created or altered, including through the use of AI. This policy went into effect in January 2024.

Advertisers now have to disclose whenever a SIEP ad contains a photorealistic image or video, or realistic sounding audio, that was digitally created or altered to:

- Depict a real person as saying or doing something they did not say or do; or
- Depict a realistic-looking person that does not exist or a realistic-looking event that did not happen, or alter footage of a real event that happened; or
- Depict a realistic event that allegedly occurred, but that is not a true image, video or audio recording of the event.

If advertisers do not disclose these specified scenarios, the ad may be disapproved. Repeated failure to disclose may result in further penalties to the account.

AI Content Around the EP Elections:

As a result of the above policies and measures, nearly 6,000 SIEP ads and over 5.7 million pieces of content across Facebook and Instagram in the EU were labelled with AI-related disclaimers around the EP elections, providing enhanced transparency to users.

The below table provides the total count of all SIEP ads and non-paid content created by users in the EU which were labelled with AI-related disclaimers, applied through self-disclosure or proactive detection. This is provided across Facebook and Instagram for the period between May 20, 2024 and June 23, 2024, broken down by EU member state.

Member State	Number of unique SIEP Ads with “digitally created” disclaimer on Facebook and Instagram combined ¹²	Number of unique pieces of content with GenAI disclaimer on Facebook ¹³	Number of unique pieces of content with GenAI disclaimer on Instagram ¹⁴
Austria	Over 50	Over 34,500	Over 30,500
Belgium	Over 350	Over 108,500	Over 48,000
Bulgaria	Less Than 50	Over 130,500	Over 26,500
Croatia	Less Than 50	Over 26,500	Over 13,500
Cyprus	Over 100	Over 29,000	Over 21,000
Czech Republic	Over 50	Over 89,500	Over 49,000
Denmark	Over 100	Over 41,000	Over 21,500
Estonia	Less Than 50	Over 7,000	Over 6,000
Finland	Less Than 50	Over 22,500	Over 16,500
France	Over 50	Over 505,000	Over 236,500
Germany	Over 450	Over 354,500	Over 290,500
Greece	Over 50	Over 111,000	Over 76,000
Hungary	Over 1,050	Over 147,500	Over 35,500
Ireland	Over 50	Over 26,000	Over 19,500
Italy	Over 1,500	Over 558,500	Over 378,500
Latvia	Less Than 50	Over 8,000	Over 6,500
Lithuania	Less Than 50	Over 38,500	Over 13,500
Luxembourg	Less Than 50	Over 5,500	Over 3,000
Malta	Less Than 50	Over 11,500	Over 5,500
Netherlands	Over 50	Over 92,000	Over 66,000
Poland	Over 50	Over 281,000	Over 192,000
Portugal	Over 50	Over 176,500	Over 129,500
Romania	Over 1,100	Over 322,500	Over 78,500
Slovakia	Over 50	Over 58,500	Over 23,000
Slovenia	Less Than 50	Over 15,000	Over 7,500
Spain	Less Than 50	Over 285,500	Over 291,000
Sweden	Over 300	Over 102,000	Over 64,500
Total EU	Over 5900	Over 3,595,000	Over 2,156,000

¹² Country is determined by advertiser’s home country.

¹³ Country is determined by content creator’s home country.

¹⁴ Country is determined by content creator’s home country.

Continuing to Foster AI Transparency through Industry Collaboration:

As noted in [Section 3](#), Meta is an active member of the EU CoP on Disinformation Taskforce and its varied working groups, including on generative AI, and attends regular meetings relating to this workstream.

Meta has also been working with other companies in the tech industry on common standards and guidelines. Meta Platforms, Inc. is a member of the [Partnership on AI](#), for example, and signed onto [the tech accord](#) designed to combat the spread of deceptive AI content in 2024 elections globally. Meta receives information from Meta Platforms, Inc. in the progress of these initiatives, and benefits from these partnerships when addressing the risks of manipulated media.